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Abstract
The article discusses the phenomenon of politically motivated public outrage around
art in Russia. The history of protests against art in Russia is relatively short but intense.
Since 90’s there occurred a number of attacks on art, the majority of which were
protests against art that in some way expressed criticism of current state policy or
Russian Orthodox Church. It may seem that in Russia the moral majority decides the
fate of controversial artistic events, but as this article argues, that conflicts around art
are frequently used by religious fundamentalists and nationalist right-wing groups to
pursue their own political agendas and gain popularity in the media.
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1. Introduction
There have been a number of public protests against art in Russia for the past two
decades and even brief observation of their chronology reveals that anti-orthodox and
oppositional connotations of art prevail over another ethical stimulus like obscenity
or racism. The history of unpunished attacks on controversial art created in today’s
Russia peculiar form of public censorship – organized campaigns initiated by pub-
lic organizations that regularly vandalize and voluntarily disrupt artistic events which
somehow criticize current policy and/or Orthodox Church. This article points out that
the spontaneous outrage of the public is often confusedwith the demands of censorship
and acts of vandalism initiated by religious fundamentalists and extreme right groups.
The article argues that with the conflicts around art such public organizations pursue
their own political agendas and are gaining popularity in the media.
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2. Methods
The aim of the article is to consider public protests in Russia from the perspective of
what factors underlie this reaction in order to reveal the ethical stimulus and the nature
of public outrage, which will be useful to distinguish affective arousal from politically
motivated attacks. The analysis of the data is theoretically based on the concept of
giving or taking offense as a political strategy or (“hate spin”), suggested by Cherian
George. The analysis is empirically grounded in the Russian experience of protests
against art.
3. Discussions
Emotional experience is an important part of our moral justifications. Protest reactions
against art represent the phenomenal power of artistic engagement. Art that reflects
somemoral challenges usually evokes heavy emotional reactions and it is hard to distin-
guish “histrionic fanaticism from the spontaneous reaction of those whose sensibilities
were offended” [1, p. 22]. Moral judgments are tightly linked to an emotional response
and can take the form of a debate, polemic, discourse, and dialogue. The importance
of affects in moral judgments was highlighted by Joshua Greene and Jonathan Haidt
[2], who found out that quick and automatic affective reactions predominate in moral
judgments. Marc Hauser proposed that moral judgments consist of much more complex
cognitive analysis and both affective and cognitive processes are involved. Baring in
mind both concepts (even though Haidt’s empirical evidence are more exhibitive) we
can conclude that emotions sometimes came prior than moral judgments [3, p. 12]. Thus
there is a great chance that a morally unacceptable artwork can evoke protest reaction
in an individual.
Contemporary cases of art conflicts rest on emotional responses to moral provo-
cations which frequently take on the form of affective arousal. We hardly can qualify
affective arousal as a complete determinant of society’s moral standards [4], because
not every morally provocative artwork stir the outrage and it is often hard to distinguish
what exactly became an emotional stimulus. One can say that protests against art
are the feature of a wholesome democratic society, e.g. W.J.T Mitchell noted that
“demonstrations in front of museums are a sign of a healthy state of affairs, not a
regrettable anomaly that should be averted by fine-tuned policies” [5, p. 142]. But
this statement needs some readjustments with regard to agenda-driven features of
contemporary protests against art. It is also necessary to observe who conveys public
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moral demands to art institutions. One of the main problems with assessing the extent
to which the Russian audience was insulted by an art piece is that art protests in
Russia happen alongside the state interests in censorship. Public protests against art
that criticize current policy or Orthodox Church in today’s Russia receive legal support
which means that even if vandalism takes place, attackers will unlikely be punished but
organizers of controversial exhibitions and artists can face serious criminal litigations.
Criminal proceedings against the organizers of offensive art events are usually instituted
under article 282 (incitement of hatred or enmity, as well as abasement of human
dignity) and article 148 (insult of religious feelings of believers) of the Criminal Code of
the Russian Federation [6]. This context provides an important concern over ideological
and political motivations of allegations on supposedly offensive art – the frequency
of art conflicts in which artists were found guilty and misleading media representation
created a delusion that 1) art protesters act on behalf of outraged majority; 2) offended
audience have a legal right for rage and violent behavior (both online and offline). The
state abetting of morally, politically or religiously motivated vandalism against artworks
is a dangerous practice but the aim of this paper is not to criticize legal regulations of
cultural processes in Russia. The musing I would like to suggest is that incidents with
morally problematic art in Russia are much more complicated than they are presented
by media and they can be considered as platforms of the debate over control of the
public spaces.
A number of thinkers have been generally outspoken about political motivations
of the offense-taking, righteous rage, violence and protest reaction. Peter Sloterdijk
claims that from the late 1980s there has been a transformation of new forms of
religious and political fundamentalism [7, p. 74]. As Sloterdijk mentions “political opinions
are conditioned and steered through symbolic operations that present a sustained
relationship to the thymotic emotions of collectives” [7, p. 20]. It is vivid that art since
late 1980 has become a notable activator of collective emotions and all steps of art
production take place in the public sphere. There is a view that cultural wars or simply
conflicts around art are in fact fights for privatizing public spaces and the content that can
be presented in them [4, p. 11]. So the opponents of artistic freedom through affective
arousal employed with considerable physical and medial investment try to become
legitimate public censors. Scholars like Martha Nussbaum [8], Christopher Balme [4],
Slavoj Žižek [9], Giorgio Agamben [10] now seem bothered by the religious and political
intolerance and how it operates in contemporary society. This article contributes to the
debate by attributing a number of attacks on art pieces motivated by its offensiveness
to political strategy.
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A sociological study of conflicts around art in the United States from 1965 to 2001
showed that public outrage around controversial artworks is used by politicians to com-
municate with voters and mobilize the electorate since the greatest number of protests
against art coincided with electoral cycles [11]. Media researcher Cherian George pro-
poses to consider the problem of offense-taking by one content or another not from a
moral and philosophical point of view, but by studying its functioning in public discourse.
George defines the phenomenon giving and taking offense as a political strategy or
“hate spin”, in which artificial public outrage is used as a means to mobilize political
supporters and intimidate opponents. The strategy of “hate spin” can focus on race,
language, religion, nationality, and other aspects of identity. [12, p. 2957].
Figure 1: Data retrieved from the website-archive of art conflicts “Forbidden Art” [13].
Since the beginning of the 1990s in the Russian patriotic discourse, there has been
emphasized the importance of the Russian Orthodox Church. The history of court
proceedings concerning the insult of religious feelings formed the Russian version
of “political correctness” [14, p. 82]. If we analyze the artistic conflicts that occurred
between 1997 and 2015 in Russia (see Figure 1), we see that out of 133 protests
against art, 64 were initiated by Orthodox activists (mostly fundamentalists) and 40
by right-wing and nationalist groups. Under the protests are meant mass meetings,
criminal complaints to the Public Prosecutor’s Office, social media campaigns and acts
of vandalism. Retrospective of protests shows that religious and political criticism in art
prevails over another moral stimulus, such as obscenity or racism [13].
Most of the protests against art in Russia are not spontaneous reactions but organized
campaigns. The first organized religious campaign against art in Russia was conducted
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in 1997 against the NTV channel, which was supposed to broadcast the film “The
Last Temptation of Christ” by Martin Scorsese [13]. Then, in 2003, after the group
of church officers destroyed the exhibition “Beware, Religion!”, the court proceedings
were instituted not against the vandals, but against the organizers of the exhibition.
The events that followed the destruction are called by philosopher and one of the
trial’s witnesses Mikhail Ryklin “the first large-scale ”clean-up operation” in the territory
of contemporary art and human rights in Russia” [1, p. 13]. Such a precedent in the
law enforcement system of the Russian Federation created among activists a sense of
impunity for the destruction of property of museums, galleries, and artists.
Cherian George argues that anti-extremist laws and laws against insulting religious
feelings are counterproductive because they give power to the most intolerant groups
of society, for example, nationalist groups [12]. As an example, we can mention Vasily
Slonov’s personal exhibition “New Jerusalem” in 2018 at the Winzavod Center for
Contemporary Art in Moscow that was attacked by members of the nationalist right-
wing group “SERB” [15]. Members of “SERB” are well known for their attacks on art
events, they regularly disrupt theatrical performances and exhibitions. In 2016 and 2017,
they twice attacked the exhibition “Absence of Shame” by the American photographer
Jock Sturges at the Lumiere Brothers center for photography in Moscow, accusing the
exhibition organizers of promoting pedophilia [16]. The behavior of public organizations
demonstrates extreme confidence in the justice of their indignation and readiness for
extreme measures, which Slavoj Žižek describes in his work “Violence” as a fake sense
of the need for urgent action in response to an infringement or insult [9, p. 6].
The use of scandals around art by right-wing radical groups for the realization of
their own political agendas is not an exclusively Russian phenomenon. For example,
in Paris in 2011, the resentment of Catholics around the provocative performance of
Romeo Castellucci “On the Concept of the Face, Regarding the Son of God” turned
into mass street riots involving right-wing groups [17, p. 129]. In general fundamentalists
and attackers on art don’t’ have any “language” to actually orchestrate communication
with those who don’t share their beliefs, thus they attack art physically. As Sloterdijk
points out, today’s rage carriers do not have a convincing narrative and this is why
other narratives like ethnic or subcultural are replaced by local simplified we-they
constructions. In conflicts around art “we” – means healthy public opinion whilst “they”
are demoralized others. Controversial or morally provocative art in this cases functions
as a potential stimulus to initiate affective arousal which with the help of mass media
could spread according to the principle of viral infections.
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4. Implications
Politically motivated protests against art are usually mistakenly perceived as a sponta-
neous reaction of those whose feelings were insulted. This happens as a result of the
substitution of public moral discourse around works of art with aggressive actions of
nationalists and religious fundamentalists. We can come to this conclusion by observing
the very fact that public outrage is often orchestrated, and the ones who are offended
immediately seek media attention. Researches propose that offensive laws should be
applied to cases that meet certain standards, e.g. offensive expressions should not be
so broad as to instigate lawsuits against controversial artistic work [12, p. 2960)] which
will help to mitigate the amount of politically motivated offense-taking from controversial
art. At the same time, there is a necessity in further researches on the phenomenon of
taking offense by art, as a personal and deeply individual emotional process.
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